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426 
UNVEILING FAIRNESS FOR THE 
CONSUMER: THE LAW, ECONOMICS 
AND JUSTICE OF EXPANDED 
ARBITRATION 
 
Bruce Wardhaugh 
 
Abstract: In recent years, the US Supreme Court has rather con-
troversially extended the ambit of the Federal Arbitration Act to 
extend arbitration’s reach into, inter alia¸ consumer matters, with 
the consequence that consumers are often (and unbeknownst to 
them) denied remedies which would otherwise be available. Such 
denied remedies include: recourse to class action proceedings, ef-
fective denial of punitive damages, access to discovery and the 
ability to resolve the matter in a convenient forum. 
The court’s extension of arbitration’s ambit is controver-
sial. Attempts to overturn this extension have been made in Con-
gress, but to no avail. In contrast to American law, European 
consumer law looks at pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate di-
rected at consumers with extreme suspicion, and does so on the 
grounds of fairness. In contrast, some argue that pre-dispute 
agreements in consumer (and employment) matters are consumer 
welfare enhancing: they decrease the costs of doing business, and 
the savings are in turn passed on to the consumer. This Article 
examines these latter claims from both an economic and norma-
tive perspective. 
The economic analysis of these arguments shows that their 
assumptions do not hold. Rather than being productive of con-
sumer surplus, the use of arbitration is likely to have the opposite 
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2014 Unveiling Fairness for the Consumer 427 
effect. The industries from which the recent Supreme Court cases 
originated not only fail to exhibit the industrial structure assumed 
by the proponents of expanded arbitration, but are also industries 
which exhibit features that facilitate consumer welfare reducing 
collusion. 
The normative analysis addresses the fairness concerns. It 
is explicitly based upon John Rawls’ notion of “justice as fair-
ness,” which can provide a lens to evaluate social institutions. 
This Rawlsian analysis considers the use of extended arbitration 
in consumer matters in the light of the earlier economic results. It 
suggests that the asymmetries present in the contractual alloca-
tion of rights serve as prima facie evidence that such arbitration–
induced exclusions are prima facie unjust and unfair. However, 
as asymmetry is only a prima facie test, a generalized criticism of 
the arbitration exclusions (of the sort found in Congress and un-
derlying the European regime) is overbroad. 
INTRODUCTION 
he litigation process is described as having two social func-
tions: dispute resolution and rule formation. “See you in 
court” or “Tell it to the judge” are typical, but somewhat vernacu-
lar, means of expressing the former function of litigation.1 Litiga-
tion also has the benefit of producing rules which can be used by 
other parties to shape their conduct in the future, and these rules 
can guide or determine how subsequent judges make their deci-
sions in future cases. However, to a very significant extent, this 
latter function of litigation is a secondary concern to the parties of 
the dispute; they do not care about being the next Palsgraf2 or 
Carlill.3 Rather, the litigants want their dispute resolved, and 
preferably in their favor. 
As parties to disputes are generally only interested in the 
result as it pertains to them, they tend to consider aspects other 
than rule making for an appropriate dispute resolution system. At 
minimum, parties will want independent decision makers who re-
spect what are to be viewed as the fundamental rights of the par-
ticipants. Among these rights are matters such as due process, 
fairness, and perceived legitimacy. These criteria are usually sat-
                                                          
 1  See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a 
Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 236 (1979). 
 2  Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 3  Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1892] 1 Q.B. 256 (C.A.). 
T 
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isfied in most public dispute resolution systems. 
Arbitration, in addition to potentially possessing the above 
criteria, is often credited with a host of other values conducive to 
efficient dispute resolution including: speed, privacy, expertise of 
the chosen arbitrator, a less formal (hence potentially less adver-
sarial) forum, and the ability to select governing law and proce-
dure. These advantages are interrelated. For instance, an arbitra-
tor with expertise in a particular industry will not require 
background evidence to be put before her, thus reducing the liti-
gation costs to the parties. When grounded by an appropriate en-
abling statute (for example, the Federal Arbitration Act4 (“FAA”)) 
an arbitrator’s decision can have the force of a judicial decision, 
and can be enforced internationally. 
Recent years have witnessed an effort to expand arbitra-
tion’s domain to account for the perceived advantages of arbitra-
tion. In the United States and Canada there has been a move-
ment to use pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer matters. 
Recent court decisions in the U.S. have, quite controversially, re-
moved many of the fetters that have prevented this expansion.5 
                                                          
 4   Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 201–208, 301–307. 
 5  These recent decisions have been criticized by members of Congress. 
Senator Al Franken is among the most vocal critics of these decisions. See, e.g., 
Senator Al Franken, Senator Reintroduces Legislation to Restore Consumers, 
Workers and Small Businesses’ Right to Seek Justice through Courts, AL 
FRANKEN U.S. SENATOR FOR MINNESOTA, (May 7, 2013), 
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=hot_topic&id=2392. This criticism has re-
sulted in the repeated introduction of Acts to legislatively repeal the Supreme 
Court’s decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 49–52. This has been 
echoed in the press. See infra notes 47–48. Academics have also not been shy 
with their own criticism. See, e.g., S. I. Strong, Constitutional Conundrums in 
Arbitration, 15 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 41 (2013) [hereinafter 
Strong, Constitutional Conundrums] (reviewing PETER B. RUTLEDGE, 
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013)). See also id. at 55 n.71 (in par-
ticular Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: The New 
Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT’L. 435 (2011); Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in 
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and 
Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 
703 (2012); Gary B. Born & Claudio Salas, The United States Supreme Court 
and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 21 (2012); 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbi-
tration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1997); S. I. Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Dis-
putes Through Class Arbitration: The United States and Canada Compared, 37 
N. C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 921 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Resolving Mass 
Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration]. 
35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 48 Side A      06/02/2014   15:10:17
35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 48 Side A      06/02/2014   15:10:17
C M
Y K
Wardhaugh Article1.docx (Do Not Delete)  5/21/2014  2:33 PM 
2014 Unveiling Fairness for the Consumer 429 
These fetters remain in Canada.6 In stark contrast, EU law disfa-
vors the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Directive 93/137 
makes it clear that, under EU law, there is a presumption that 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are unfair 
to the consumer and thus invalid.8 
Similar views have been expressed in the U.S. in the af-
termath of recent Supreme Court decisions that have further ex-
tended the use of arbitration into the domain of consumer law.9 
All of the discussion resonates with the tune of “unfairness” or 
“injustice.” Yet, this tune is often sung at a very unsophisticated 
level—with the terms “fairness” and “justice” thrown out at a 
very intuitive level. 
In this Article, I propose to use a developed account of 
fairness and its relationship to justice to examine the expansion of 
arbitration into the domain of consumer law. The theory used is 
John Rawls’ well known theory of “justice as fairness,”10 which 
provides for a means of determining whether a particular ar-
rangement is just or fair. Rawls’ insight is by way of a thought 
experiment. Designers of a particular social institution are put 
behind a metaphorical “veil of ignorance,” which deprives them 
of any particular knowledge of morally irrelevant characteristics 
which they can use to design the social system to their advantage. 
To the extent that an actual social system reflects one which 
would be hypothetically designed behind the veil, the actual sys-
tem can be regarded as “fair” or just. 
                                                          
 6  In Canada some fetters still remain, though arbitration is generally per-
mitted as a means of resolving consumer disputes. See Dell Computer Corp. v. 
Union Des Consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801 (Can.); Seidel v. TELUS 
Commc’ns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531 (Can.). See also Shelly McGill, Consumer 
Arbitration and Class Actions: The Impact of Dell Computer Corp. v. Union 
Des Consommateurs, 45 CAN. BUS. L. J. 334 (2007); Jonnette Watson Hamil-
ton, Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses: Denying Access to Justice?, 51 
MCGILL L. J. 693 (2006); Strong, Constitutional Conundrums, supra note 5; 
Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration, supra note 
5. 
 7  Council Directive 93/13/EEC, of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Con-
sumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 [hereinafter Council Directive 
93/13/ECC]. 
 8  See, e.g., CHARTERED INST. OF ARBITRATORS, PRACTICE GUIDELINE 
17: GUIDELINES FOR ARBITRATORS DEALING WITH CASES INVOLVING 
CONSUMERS AND PARTIES WITH SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES OF RESOURCES 
§ 1.2 (n.d), available at http://www.ciarb.org/information-and-
resources/Practice%20Guideline%2017.pdf. 
 9  See infra text accompanying notes 15–45. 
 10  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). 
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This analytic lens provides a useful insight into the fair-
ness, and hence justice, of contractual arrangements recently con-
sidered by the Supreme Court. I argue that the Rawlsian ap-
proach demonstrates that asymmetries in the creation or 
exclusion of rights and obligations by means of such arbitration 
agreements are strong indicia of unfairness. However, they are 
merely prima facia indicia, capable of being rebutted when the 
benefits of the exclusions are subjected to further scrutiny.  As 
such, sweeping condemnation of such clauses may be too far-
reaching. 
The examination of these benefits is primarily an econom-
ic task, the results of which suggest that the industries involved in 
recent Supreme Court consumer arbitration matters have a struc-
ture that facilitates collusion and cartel formation. As cartels not 
only fix prices, but also collude on terms of service, I suggest that 
a consequence of the use of such exclusions is not to benefit con-
sumers. Rather, the use of arbitration may have the very opposite 
effect, namely the facilitation of appropriation of consumer sur-
plus. If my suggestion is correct, this has significant import not 
just for our Rawlsian normative argument, but also it may well 
undermine the economic assumptions used to justify these exclu-
sions in the first place. 
This Article is structured as follows: Part I examines the 
use of arbitration as a dispute resolution method in international 
commercial disputes. The widespread use of arbitration in this 
context points to some of its intuitive advantages as a means of 
resolving these sorts of disputes. It thus provides an example of 
paradigmatically “fair” arbitration. Such a paradigm serves as a 
point of contrast to what follows it. 
Part II evaluates the American regime of expanded con-
sumer arbitration. This Part argues that the expansion of arbitra-
tion, which could possibly benefit consumers by reducing prices 
(as some proponents of consumer arbitration argue), has had the 
actual result of shifting costs onto unsuspecting (and perhaps un-
sophisticated) consumers.   
Part III considers the purported advantages of expanded 
arbitration. The economic assumptions of these advantages are 
discussed in Part IV. These assumptions raise concerns of fairness 
and justice, which are considered in Part V. To address these is-
sues, I use Rawls’ perspective, which develops a sophisticated ac-
counting of fairness as a basis for determining the extent to which 
a particular social institution can be regarded as just. This analy-
sis shows difficulties with some of the exclusions considered by 
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the Supreme Court. However, this analysis does not unequivocal-
ly condemn all such exclusions, thus suggesting not just that there 
may be room for some of these exceptions in normatively “fair” 
arbitration agreements, but also that legislative efforts to limit the 
use of exceptions may therefore be overbroad. 
I.  PARADIGMATICALLY “FAIR” ARBITRATION 
Before discussing the FAA and its recent judicial expan-
sion into consumer and employment matters, a few words must 
be said regarding the type of arbitration that is intuitively viewed 
as a paradigm of a fair arbitration: namely the use of dispute 
resolution in the context of a transaction between two parties who 
possess roughly equal bargaining power.11 The transaction in 
question may have an international dimension, which provides 
an additional reason for the parties to select a private, non-state, 
means of resolving their dispute. 
This international dimension of the contracts governing 
the transaction introduces not just a need for precision regarding 
the applicable law which governs the contract and the law gov-
erning the arbitration, which can be different; but also may influ-
ence a desire for a neutral adjudicator (that is, not of the same na-
tionality as either party). Such a dimension assists in eliminating 
the feeling that one party may have a “home field advantage,” 
were that party’s courts or citizens are permitted to determine the 
outcome. The use of arbitration may facilitate the parties’ confi-
dence in the arbitrator’s ability to come to an appropriate deci-
sion because of the arbitrator’s possession of a specialized back-
ground (e.g., specialized knowledge of the practices of a particular 
industry). Further, arbitration may have the advantage of confi-
dentiality: the parties may prefer that their business affairs and/or 
the details of their relationships not become widely known within 
or beyond the industry. The less adversarial nature of the arbitra-
tion process may facilitate or not hinder future cooperation be-
tween the parties, should they envisage a relationship beyond the 
contract in dispute. 
                                                          
 11  For similar discussions of the merits of arbitration, see, e.g., GARY B. 
BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 19–25 (2011) 
(hereafter, “BORN, CASES AND MATERIALS”); GARY B. BORN, 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 3–6, 9–17 (2012) (hereaf-
ter, “BORN, LAW AND PRACTICE”); Edna Sussman, The Arbitration Fairness 
Act: Unintended Consequences Threaten U. S. Businesses, 18 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 455, 461–62 (2009). 
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If the transaction occurs in the context of a specialized 
market, it may make sense to appoint an adjudicator with exper-
tise in that market. This typically reduces not only the costs of 
presenting the required information before a possibly inexpert ad-
judicator, but also the possibility of error resulting from a misap-
prehension of evidence.12 Likewise, in the case of, for example, an 
extensive construction project, the parties—prior to the dispute 
occurring—may have little idea of the subject matter of any par-
ticular dispute which may occur in the future. Again, from a cost 
reduction perspective, it makes significant sense to be able to ap-
point the adjudicator once the nature of the dispute is known. 
Presenting the relevant material to an adjudicator with an engi-
neering background may be appropriate if a quality issue is the 
subject of dispute, but an adjudicator with a different back-
ground may be more appropriate to resolve other sorts of issues. 
A lawyer or an industry expert may be a more appropriate choice 
where other controversies (for example, interpretation of “within 
a reasonable time”) are involved. 
Arbitration through an arbitration institution, for instance 
the International Chamber of Commerce or the London Court of 
International Arbitration has the further advantage of credence, 
as these institutions have developed an international reputation 
for knowledgeable competent arbitrators. They operate under an 
attractive lex arbitri. Their reputation insures not only that the 
appropriate judicial oversight of the process will be used in the 
unlikely event that things go wrong during the arbitration, but al-
so the ability for international enforceability of the award. 
Arbitration pursued through trading or industry associa-
tions may share the best features of institutional and ad hoc arbi-
tration: the membership of both parties in the organization is 
recognition of that institution’s credibility. The specialized nature 
of the organization and its choice of members of arbitration pan-
els ensure that these arbitrators have the desired technical and 
industry background to accurately and efficiently resolve the dis-
putes.13 Further, given the commercial context of bulk commodi-
                                                          
 12  These error costs could be significant where the lex arbitri precludes 
setting aside (or appeal) of an arbitral award on the grounds of misapprehen-
sion of fact. See, e.g., Arbitration Act, 1996, §§ 67–73 (U.K.); Id. § 69 (error on 
a point of law may be a ground. However, it should be noted that the institu-
tional arbitration rules require parties to specifically waive their § 69 rights. 
See LCIA Arbitration Rules, Art. 26.9 (1998); Int’l Comm. Arb., Rules of Arbi-
tration, Art. 28 (2012). 
 13  See, e.g., the arbitration and contract-issuing practices of The Federa-
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ties trading, a trading house may be both a purchaser and seller 
of commodities under the same standard form contract. These 
parties therefore arbitrate disputes under the contract in both ca-
pacities; hence there is simply no incentive for the terms of the 
arbitration agreement or the institutional rules to favor one side 
over the other. In contrast, there is every incentive to ensure 
equality between the parties’ contractual rights and obligations in 
such circumstances. 
Note that central to this paradigm is the idea that the 
agreement to arbitrate is voluntary concluded with awareness on 
the part of the parties of the benefits gained through arbitration 
and what rights and remedies may be waived in the arbitration 
process.14 The voluntary acceptance of the arbitration agreement 
by parties with equal bargaining power is significant evidence 
that, in agreeing to arbitration as part of the bargain, any conse-
quences of arbitration (for instance, prohibitions on the pursuit of 
remedies of a certain type, waivers of certain rights, limitations as 
to the set of potential arbitrators) are otherwise compensated for 
by other aspects of the bargain construed in its entirety. 
II.  THE FAA AND THE EXPANSION OF CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION 
Although the original purpose of the FAA was to establish 
a statutory basis to overcome judicial hostility towards commer-
cial arbitration,15 the Supreme Court has subsequently interpret-
ed the Act to widen its scope and regard it as a cornerstone of a 
                                                          
tion of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations (FOSFA), the London-based body 
which develops standard form contracts (and arbitrates disputes which arise 
under them) for the sale of oilseeds, oils and fats. See, FOSFA 
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.fosfa.org. Approximately 85% of the world trade 
in these commodities is conducted under these contracts. Id. 
 14  For instance, in a Bermuda form contract, punitive damages are ex-
cluded from the available remedies. These contracts are reinsurance contracts, 
governed by New York law with punitive damages excluded, arbitrated (typi-
cally in London) under the Arbitration Act, 1996 (U.K.). See, e.g., C. v. D., 
[2007] EWHC 1541 (Comm); [2007] 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 557, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 367, [2007] 1 C.L.C. 1038. The LCIA and ICC arbitration rules limit dis-
covery. See BORN, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11 at 178–189. They fur-
ther require the parties to waive the right to set aside an award on the ground 
of arbitrator’s error on a point of law. See supra note 12. 
 15  See A.T. & T. Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 
(2011); BORN, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 19–25. 
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“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.”16 This widened scope 
has facilitated, if not encouraged, the spread of arbitration from a 
method of resolving disputes among commercial entities to a 
means of resolving business-consumer disputes.17 Consumer con-
tracts requiring arbitration now concern cellular phones,18 nurs-
ing homes,19 retailers’ contracts with charge card providers,20 
dealings with pay-day loan providers,21 and even fast-food res-
taurant contests.22 One study, published in 2002 showed that ap-
proximately 33% of “important” consumer transactions were gov-
erned by contracts which mandated arbitration.23 Arbitration 
agreements have also crept into employment matters.24 Given this 
recent explosion of judicial support for the expanded use of arbi-
tration, the prevalence of contractually mandated arbitration is 
bound to increase. Mandatory arbitration will likely continue to 
rapidly extend to other areas involving crucial aspects of peoples’ 
lives. 
The result of expanded arbitration is that these arbitration 
clauses have required consumers and employees to: forego claims 
of punitive damages,25 forego the ability to take part in class ac-
                                                          
 16  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corpora-
tion, 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S. Ct. 927, 941 (1983). 
 17  See Jean R Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1635–1642 (2004). 
 18  E.g., Concepcion. 
 19  E.g., Marmet Health Care Center Inc. v. Clayton Brown, 132 S. Ct. 
1201 (2012) vacated sub nom. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 
250 (W. Va. 2011) remanded to sub nom. Brown v. Gensis Healthcare Corp., 
729 S.E.2d 217 (W. Va 2012). 
 20  E.g., American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 
2304 (2013). 
 21  E.g., Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
 22  E.g., Popovich v McDonald’s Corp., 189 F. Supp. 2d 722 (N.D. Ill. 
2002). 
 23  Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate 
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 58 (2005) (“Important purchases” were de-
fined as “as purchases that are expensive, ongoing, or have a potentially large 
impact on [the consumer’s] life”). 
 24  See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); 
Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F. 3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). Note though 
that in the latter case the employee prevailed. This was due to the one-sided 
nature of the employer’s arbitration procedure and not because this dispute 
was not amenable to arbitration. 
 25  See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Center Inc. v. Clayton Brown, 132 S. Ct. 
1201 (2012); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 
(1995); Stipanowich, supra note 5. 
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tions26 (even when participating in class actions would be the only 
economically feasible means of pursuing the action),27 forego dis-
covery,28 have the choice of the arbiter imposed on the consumer 
or employee,29 and to arbitrate the matter in a location far re-
moved from the consumer’s place of residence.30 
According to recent US Supreme Court case law, the justi-
fication for this is that arbitration is a contractual matter,31 and as 
such, arbitration agreements are to be enforced according to their 
terms. In a 2011 pronouncement, A.T.&T. Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion, the majority of the US Supreme Court reasoned: 
The “principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that 
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to 
their terms.” . . . . This purpose is readily apparent from 
the FAA’s text. Section 2 makes arbitration agreements 
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” as written (subject, 
of course, to the saving clause); §3 requires courts to stay 
litigation of arbitral claims pending arbitration of those 
claims “in accordance with the terms of the agreement:” 
and §4 requires courts to compel arbitration “in accord-
ance with the terms of the agreement” upon the motion 
of either party to the agreement (assuming that the 
“making of the arbitration agreement or the failure . . . 
to perform the same” is not at issue). In light of these 
                                                          
 26  See, e.g., A.T. & T. Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); 
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 27  E.g., Italian Colors. 
 28  See, e.g. Hooters of America, Inc., 173 F. 3d at 938; Hooters of America 
Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614, 618 (D. S.C. 1998) (regarding the 
asymmetries in discovery). 
 29  See, e.g., Hooters of America, Inc., 173 F. 3d at 938. 
 30  See, e.g., Newton v. American Debt Svces. No. 12–15549, 2013 WL 
6501391 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2013). This was an almost foregone conclusion re-
sulting from Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) and Scherk v. 
Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1971). See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or 
Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbi-
tration, WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 688 (1996). See also, Nagrampa v. Mailcorps, Inc., 
496 F. 3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 31  Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 
(2010) (“The FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a mat-
ter of contract. . . . The FAA thereby places arbitration agreements on an equal 
footing with other contracts . . . and requires courts to enforce them according 
to their terms.” citing Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 
443 (2006); Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478, (1989)). 
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provisions, we have held that parties may agree to limit 
the issues subject to arbitration, . . . to arbitrate accord-
ing to specific rules, . . .  and to limit with whom a party 
will arbitrate its disputes, . . . .32 
The majority opined that this expanded role of arbitration 
is justified on the grounds of party autonomy and efficiency: 
The point of affording parties discretion in designing 
arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, stream-
lined procedures tailored to the type of dispute. It can be 
specified, for example, that the decision maker be a spe-
cialist in the relevant field, or that proceedings be kept 
confidential to protect trade secrets. And the informality 
of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the 
cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution. . . .33 
Consequently, the majority interpreted that the FAA 
mandates a wide scope for parties to resolve any disputes through 
arbitration. 
To the extent that state law precludes the arbitration of 
certain types of claims, state law is displaced by the FAA.34 Alt-
hough §2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements are 
unenforceable on the same legal or equitable grounds as any oth-
er contract,35 courts interpret the savings clause to mean that any 
ground for “revoking” an arbitration clause must apply to all con-
tracts generally, and not merely to agreements to arbitrate.36 In 
                                                          
 32  A.T. & T. Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748–49 (2011). 
 33  Id. at 1749. 
 34  Id. at 1747. See also Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 
(1995). 
 35  See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, which provides: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereaf-
ter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the 
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration 
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
 36  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 provides: 
We said that a court may not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbi-
trate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscion-
able, for this would enable the court to effect what . . . the state legislature 
cannot. 
(citations omitted). 
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other words, neither state legislatures nor state courts can carve 
out arbitration-specific exceptions to the FAA’s pro-arbitration 
policy. 
Consequently, courts uphold arbitration agreements 
which eliminate consumer’s recourse to class action.37 In Febru-
ary 2012, holding a state statute which purportedly invalidated 
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate—here an agreement to arbi-
trate wrongful death cases against nursing home—was contrary 
to the FAA, referring to its past rulings, the US Supreme Court 
remarked: 
West Virginia’s prohibition against predispute agree-
ments to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death 
claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule pro-
hibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and 
that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the 
FAA. . . . . See also, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U. S. 346, 
356 (2008) (FAA pre-empts state law granting state 
commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide issue the 
parties agreed to arbitrate); Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 56 (1995) (FAA 
preempts state law requiring judicial resolution of 
claims involving punitive damages); Perry v. Thomas, 
482 U. S. 483, 491 (1987) (FAA pre-empts state-law re-
quirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for 
wage disputes); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 
10 (1984) (FAA pre-empts state financial investment 
statute’s prohibition of arbitration of claims brought 
under that statute).38 
Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter back to the 
State Supreme Court to determine if the arbitration clauses in 
question were “unenforceable under state common law principles 
that are not specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA.”39  
Next, in June 2013, the Supreme Court upheld the enforceability 
of arbitration clauses which precluded class arbitration even 
when the costs of the required individual arbitration would ex-
ceed the possible recovery.40 
                                                          
 37  Id. 
 38  Marmet Health Care Center Inc. v. Clayton Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 
1203–4 (2012). 
 39  Id. at 1205. 
 40  American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 
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As a result of this bias towards enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements, American consumer contracts frequently contain 
clauses which limit consumers’ substantive remedies and proce-
dural safeguards.41 Typically limits on remedies and procedure 
imposed by arbitration clauses include: (1) the exclusion of class 
relief;42 (2) a limit to exposure to certain types of damages (e.g., 
punitive damages);43 (3) limit discovery;44 and (4) limit the sorts of 
disputes which can be arbitrated, hence reserving—or “carving 
out”—for the company the right to litigate other matters.45 These 
latter cases are often found in credit agreements, requiring arbi-
tration of all matters other than those relating to debt collection.  
The resulting popularity with larger entities thus rests in the enti-
ty’s ability to use arbitration clauses to limit or exclude the larger 
entity’s exposure to certain types of damages and/or class action 
claims.46 In addition, by making arbitration uneconomical or in-
convenient, the party requiring arbitration can effectively insu-
late itself from exposure to damages it might otherwise be com-
pelled to pay. 
These limitations, foisted through arbitration clauses, are 
almost exclusively imposed on the economically weaker party. As 
such they are typically viewed as solely beneficial to the stronger 
party, which imposed the limitations, and by being written into 
“take it or leave it” contracts of adhesion, the “fairness” or “jus-
tice” in use and enforcement of arbitration agreements in this way 
is a concern. It is particularly concerning given the effects of the 
arbitration clause. The concern is not only an academic concern,47 
but has also been a subject of comment in the popular press.48 It 
                                                          
(2013). 
 41  See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 42  Italian Colors and Concepcion. 
 43  Marmet Health Care Center. See also, infra text accompanying note 71. 
 44  Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F. 3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 45  See, e.g., Lackey v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 498 S.E.2d 898 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1998); Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 46  See, Jean A. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to 
Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Uncon-
scionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 75 n.2 (2004) (who canvass 
some of practitioner literature which advise companies to use arbitration 
clauses to this end). 
 47  See, e.g., Franken, supra note 5. 
 48  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., Justice for Big Business, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/opinion/justice-for-
big-business.html?_r=1&; Alison Frankel, What hope remains for consumers, 
employees after SCOTUS Amex ruling?, REUTERS, June 20, 2013,  
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also appears to be part of the  motivation behind Congressional 
attempts to reverse the favorable approach to the use of arbitra-
tion to preempt state consumer legislation. 
The most recent Congressional attempt at reform, the Ar-
bitration Fairness Act of 2013,49 identifies the problem in the par-
ties’ disparate economic strength. Section 2 of that Act would 
read: 
The Congress finds the following: 
. . . 
(3) Most consumers and employees have little or no 
meaningful choice whether to submit their claims to ar-
bitration. Often, consumers and employees are not even 
aware that they have given up their rights. 
(4) Mandatory arbitration undermines the development 
of public law because there is inadequate transparency 
and inadequate judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions. 
(5) Arbitration can be an acceptable alternative when 
consent to the arbitration is truly voluntary, and occurs 
after the dispute arises. 
The 200750 and 200951 Acts are somewhat more emphatic, 
noting that abuses arising from the asymmetries of bargaining 
power and information are found in many situations where such 
agreements are used.  These asymmetries act to the detriment of 
consumers and employees.  Accordingly these Acts find: 
(3) Most consumers and employees have little or no 
meaningful option whether to submit their claims to ar-
bitration. Few people realize, or understand the im-
portance of the deliberately fine print that strips them of 
rights; and because entire industries are adopting these 
clauses, people increasingly have no choice but to accept 
                                                          
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/06/20/what-hope-remains-for-
consumers-employees-after-scotus-amex-ruling-2/. 
 49  S. 878, 103th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013).  This Act is 
identical to the Arbitration Fairness Act 2011, S. 987 112th Congress; H.R. 
1873, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 50  S. 1782, 100th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3010, 110th  Cong. (2007). 
 51  Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1020, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
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them. They must often give up their rights as a condi-
tion of having a job, getting necessary medical care, 
buying a car, opening a bank account, getting a credit 
card, and the like. Often times, they are not even aware 
that they have given up their rights. 
(4) Private arbitration companies are sometimes under 
great pressure to devise systems that favor the corporate 
repeat players who decide whether those companies will 
receive their lucrative business. 
(5) Mandatory arbitration undermines the development 
of public law for civil rights and consumer rights, be-
cause there is no meaningful judicial review of arbitra-
tors’ decisions. With the knowledge that their rulings 
will not be seriously examined by a court applying cur-
rent law, arbitrators enjoy near complete freedom to ig-
nore the law and even their own rules. 
(6) Mandatory arbitration is a poor system for protect-
ing civil rights and consumer rights because it is not 
transparent. . . . 
(7) Many corporations add to their arbitration clauses 
unfair provisions that deliberately tilt the systems 
against individuals, including provisions that strip indi-
viduals of substantive statutory rights, ban class actions, 
and force people to arbitrate their claims hundreds of 
miles from their homes. While some courts have been 
protective of individuals, too many courts have upheld 
even egregiously unfair mandatory arbitration clauses 
in deference to a supposed Federal policy favoring arbi-
tration over the constitutional rights of individuals.52 
The concerns expressed in the Arbitration Fairness Acts 
are not unique to members of Congress. 
EU law takes a similar view to contracts of adhesion. Ar-
ticle 3 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC deems contractual provi-
sions which are significantly detrimental to the consumer and 
imposed in such circumstances to be unfair.  It provides: 
                                                          
 52  Arbitration Fairness Act 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). This is 
taken verbatim from the Arbitration Fairness Act 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 
2. 
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1. A contractual term which has not been individually 
negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the 
requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbal-
ance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under 
the contract, to the detriment of the consumer. 
2. A term shall always be regarded as not individually 
negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the 
consumer has therefore not been able to influence the 
substance of the term, particularly in the context of a 
pre-formulated standard contract. 
The fact that certain aspects of a term or one specific 
term have been individually negotiated shall not ex-
clude the application of this Article to the rest of a con-
tract if an overall assessment of the contract indicates 
that it is nevertheless a pre-formulated standard con-
tract.53 
Pursuant to Article 6 of that Directive, such unfair terms 
are void and severable from the remainder of the contract54 and 
Member States are permitted to adopt the “most stringent provi-
sions compatible with the Treaty in the area covered by this Di-
rective, to ensure a maximum degree of protection for the con-
sumer.”55 Pre-dispute consumer agreements are voidable under 
the laws of the United Kingdom,56 and, in addition, these laws 
provide: 
excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take le-
gal action or exercise any other legal remedy, particular-
ly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusive-
ly to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly 
                                                          
 53  Council Directive 93/13/EEC, supra note 7. This has been transposed 
into U.K. law by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1999, 
S.I. 1999 No. 2083, § 5(1) (U.K.). 
 54  See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, supra note 7., Art. 6(1) provides: 
Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded 
with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their na-
tional law, not be binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue 
to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence 
without the unfair terms. 
 55  Id., Art. 8. 
 56  Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act, 1988, c. 21, § 1 (Eng., Wales, 
and N. Ir.), §§ 6–9 (Scot.). See also, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations, 1999, S.I. 1999 No. 2083, § 5(5) (U.K.). 
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restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on 
him a burden of proof which, according to the applica-
ble law, should lie with another party to the contract57 
are deemed to be unfair, and hence voidable, provisions in a con-
sumer contract. 
In light of these Congressional assertions regarding un-
fairness of such terms imposed through arbitration, and the fact 
that other jurisdictions appear to agree with this sentiment, an 
assessment of the “fairness of” or “justice in using” such clauses is 
merited. This assessment must be conducted from two angles. 
First, from the perspective of those advocating the use of these 
exclusions, to identify their purported advantages. Second, from a 
normative perspective informed by a well-developed theory of 
fairness. This is the purpose of the final Parts of this Article. 
III.  THE PURPORTED ADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION 
EXCLUSIONS 
There are strong arguments which suggest that these types 
of exclusions can have a consumer welfare enhancing effect by 
reducing the costs consumers pay for their goods or services. In 
his 2001 article, Ware,58 selected what he considers to be four in-
stances where the exclusion of consumers’ substantive and pro-
cedural rights through arbitration agreements has the effect of 
reducing the prices that consumers pay for goods or services, thus 
enhancing consumer welfare. The exclusions which Ware identi-
fies are: (1) disallowance of class actions; (2) disallowance of “sub-
sidized” arbitration fees (i.e., consumers pay their share of the 
costs of arbitration); (3) limitation on discovery; and (4) permit-
ting “carve-outs” (i.e., the practice that the consumer is required 
to arbitrate all matters in dispute, but the business can “carve-
out” matters from arbitration and litigate these).59 Typically 
“carve-outs” reserve the right to litigate collections issues in fi-
nance contracts.60 An often encountered carve-out is the limit (ei-
ther explicitly or as a consequence of the choice of a “profession-
al” arbitrator) of certain forms of damages, particularly punitive 
                                                          
 57  The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1999, S.I. 1999 
No. 2083, sch 2, §1(q) (U.K.). 
 58  See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Progress: Judicial Regu-
lation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89 (2001). 
 59  Id. at 93–99. 
 60  Id. at 97–98. 
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damages.61 The justification for, and analysis of, this exclusion 
reduces to those surrounding exclusions for class actions. These 
arguments merit further analysis. 
The analysis contains three stages. First, the arguments 
themselves must be examined to measure their force. Second, the 
assumptions on which the arguments rest require investigation, 
which will permit the display of any limits that these arguments 
have. Finally, even if these arguments are forceful and based on 
realistic assumptions which permit them to be taken to have more 
general effect, a further line of inquiry must still be pursued. 
These arguments are ultimately premised on the idea that cost 
savings are the paramount, if not sole, goal to be pursued by this 
approach to consumer arbitration.  In this Part, I will examine 
whether this is or is not the case.  The remainder of this Part ad-
dresses the first of these two points.  
A. Elimination of Class Actions and Punitive Damages 
By eliminating consumers’ access to class actions, compa-
nies can effectively insulate themselves from a significant amount 
of damages. The transaction and opportunity costs involved in 
prosecuting low value claims significantly outweigh the value of 
such claims. This is enhanced in the American “user-pays” cost 
system where no costs are awarded irrespective of the party’s 
success. In addition, an opportunity cost involved in litigation 
may, and often does, exceed the expected value of the result. Thus 
pursuit of the litigation becomes an irrational pastime, and thus 
not pursued by any economically rational individual. 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Concepcion points out this con-
sequence: 
Regardless, the majority highlights the disadvantages of 
class arbitrations, as it sees them. See ante, . . . (referring 
to the “greatly increase[d] risks to defendants”; the 
“chance of a devastating loss” pressuring defendants “in-
to settling questionable claims”). But class proceedings 
have countervailing advantages. In general agreements 
that forbid the consolidation of claims can lead small 
dollar claimants to abandon their claims rather than to 
litigate. I suspect that it is true even here, for as the 
Court of Appeals recognized, AT&T can avoid the 
                                                          
 61  See infra discussion and text accompanying notes 69–71. 
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$7,500 payout (the payout that supposedly makes Con-
cepcions’ arbitration worthwhile) simply by paying the 
claim’s face value, such that “the maximum gain to a 
customer for the hassle of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is 
still just $30.22.” Laster  v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F. 
3d 849, 855, 856 (CA9 2009). 
   What rational lawyer would have signed on to repre-
sent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of 
fees stemming from a $30.22 claim? See, e.g., Carnegie 
v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F. 3d 656, 661 (CA7 2004) 
(“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 mil-
lion individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a 
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30”).62 
 
This strategy can be extended by increasing the costs of 
pursuing a remedy.  Imposing an arbitration process which re-
quires consumers to incur costs, whether in the form of filing or 
other fees for services63 or cost shifting (i.e., “loser pays”) will de-
ter a significant number of claims. By reducing their exposure, 
the argument runs, companies reduce their costs in numerous 
ways.  These involve such savings as lower insurance and legal 
costs, financial resources can be invested rather than being held 
in reserve to possibly defend and satisfy claims, and the like.  
These cost savings will via markets forces be passed onto con-
sumers. Or, so it is argued. 
This argument is frequently buttressed with the claim that 
class actions benefit class counsel rather than members of the 
class, thus resulting in little consumer benefit. Ware  supports this 
position, arguing that businesses can incur liability as a result of 
class actions.  Yet consumers do not see the benefits of such ac-
tions, rather class counsel appropriates these benefits in the form 
of enhanced fees.64 
                                                          
 62 A.T. & T. Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1760–61 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 63  Subpoenas and hearings to compel discovery are examples of such ser-
vices which add costs.  See, Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 
250, 294 (W. Va. 2011).  See also, Morten Hviid & Greg Shaffer, Hassle Costs: 
The Achilles’ Heel of Price-Matching Guarantees, 8 J. ECON. & MAN. STRAT. 
489 (1999) (who explore the notion of “hassle costs,” and their effect on deter-
ring otherwise beneficial behavior). 
 64  Ware, supra note 58, at 93. See also e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: 
The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995). 
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Three points must be made regarding this latter claim. 
Since 2005, the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)65 has remedied 
some of the perceived excesses of the previous class action system, 
particularly in regard to control of counsels’ conduct of the mat-
ter and their remuneration. Specifically, the CAFA attempts to 
control the excesses of coupon settlements.66 Likewise the CAFA 
enhances judicial review of settlements to ensure that class mem-
bers’ interests are taken into account during the settlement pro-
cess. 
Second, to a great extent, the issues surrounding class 
counsels’ conduct in litigation (and their subsequent remunera-
tion) involves an agency problem. By definition, class members 
have a small stake in the outcome of the litigation, giving rise to 
limited incentive to monitor class counsel. Class counsel’s incen-
tive is to obtain an acceptable settlement with the least effort, and 
then move on to more lucrative endeavors. However, such agency 
issues are pervasive in the attorney-client relationship. Counsel 
paid by the hour has an incentive to expend a significant amount 
of time on matters which may be of peripheral relevance to the 
particular client’s concern. Likewise, in a flat-fee arrangement, 
the incentive for a lawyer is to produce a minimally acceptable 
result in as little time as possible. Given the pervasive nature of 
these sorts of issues in the attorney-client relationship, it is some-
what disingenuous to single out class actions as a matter of specif-
ic concern.67 
Third, and certainly not of least significance, is the point 
made by the dissents in both Concepcion and Italian Colors,68 
that by imposing such arbitration clauses, the entity in the 
stronger economic position will “make pursuit of the . . . claim a 
                                                          
 65  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–
1715. 
 66  Coupon settlements are those which all or part of the “payment” to class 
members takes the form of the “coupons” for future discounts.  The value of 
the settlement (and hence counsel’s remuneration) is based on the total value 
of the coupons issued, not the value of coupons redeemed.  Such settlements 
are now controlled by § 1712 of the CAFA. See 28. U.S.C. § 1712. 
 67  Some of these arguments are canvassed in greater detail in Bruce 
Wardhaugh, Bogeymen, Lunatics and Fanatics: Collective Actions and the 
Private Enforcement of European Competition Law, 34 LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014) 
[hereafter Wardhaugh, Bogeymen]. 
 68  American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 
2313–2317 (2013) (Kagan J., dissenting). See A.T. & T. Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1759–60 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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fool’s errand,”69 by ensuring that the pursuit of any claim is une-
conomical. The result of this is for the stronger party to “depriv[e] 
its victims of all legal recourse.”70 While depriving a harmed indi-
vidual of any remedy may reduce the costs of the party which in-
flicted the harm, as we examine below such cost-savings may not 
necessarily be passed on, nor may this imposition of risk be 
viewed as “fair” or “just” when exposed to a normative analysis 
which considers more than just cost-savings. 
The argument that the use of arbitration agreements to 
limit the types of damages available to consumers results in costs 
savings which are in turn passed onto consumers reduces to the 
argument above. The arbitration agreements need not specifically 
exclude such claims to have this effect. Rather, the fact that the 
dispute is placed into the hands of a professional arbitrator takes 
it away from a potential “runaway jury.” Not only was this the 
reason why arbitration was incorporated into the contract by the 
nursing homes in Brown but also that the State Supreme Court 
saw through this motivation in their judgment. They reasoned: 
Still, we have recognized that the constitutionally-
enshrined and fundamental rights to assert one’s claims 
for justice before a jury in the public court system may 
be the subject of a legally enforceable waiver. However, 
‘‘Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against 
waiver of a fundamental constitutional right and will 
not presume acquiescence in the loss of such fundamen-
tal right.’’ 
In essence, our [state] Constitution recognizes that fac-
tual disputes should be decided by juries of lay citizens 
rather than paid, professional fact-finders (arbitrators) 
who may be more interested in their fees than the dis-
putes at hand.71 
This suggests that an arbitrator’s award is less likely to 
compensate for non-economic losses than a jury’s verdict. If this 
assumption is correct, such elimination of remedies thereby de-
prives a claimant of her rights to recover for non-economic dam-
ages. However, if this analysis of the assumption that a profes-
sional arbitrator is less likely to award certain categories of 
                                                          
 69  Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2313. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 271 (W. Va. 2011). 
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damages is correct, then the merits of the use of arbitrators to 
achieve these purposes reduce to the earlier discussed case of the 
use of arbitration to eliminate class actions. 
B. Elimination of Discovery 
Limitations on discovery clearly reduce costs to the com-
panies involved. However, in spite of this potential benefit, courts 
have been somewhat reluctant to uncritically enforce arbitration 
agreements which unduly restrict consumers’ discovery. Due to 
the asymmetry in availability of information, restrictions on dis-
covery can make it difficult and sometimes impossible for a con-
sumer to pursue a valid claim.72 In Kinney v United Health Care 
Services,73 (cited by Ware)74 the California Court of Appeals re-
marked: 
The unconscionable nature of the unilateral arbitral ob-
ligation is heightened by certain other terms of United’s 
arbitration policy. Given that United is presumably in 
possession of the vast majority of evidence that would 
be relevant to employment-related claims against it, the 
limitations on discovery, although equally applicable to 
both parties, work to curtail the employee’s ability to 
substantiate any claim against United. Further, to the 
extent the arbitration clause forecloses any finding that 
the employment relationship was other than at will, an 
employee is precluded from demonstrating that United 
could only terminate for good cause so as to support a 
recovery of contract damages that might otherwise be 
available. Similarly, the arbitration policy caps the em-
ployee’s recovery of compensatory and punitive damag-
es for employment discrimination.75 
 Such reluctance is increased where limitations on discovery 
form one aspect of a number of procedural barriers which may 
                                                          
 72  See the references in Ware, supra note 58, at 97 n.49–51; Paul Haagen, 
New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory 
Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1051 (1998); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking 
the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitra-
tion: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process 
Clauses, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 89–90 (1997). 
 73  Kinney v. United Healthcare Services, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322 (1999). 
 74  Ware, supra note 58, at 97. 
 75  Kinney, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1332. 
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act to prevent a consumer from vindicating her claim.76  Kinney 
is not an outlier example of this.77 
 Prior to 2012, courts were likely to find arbitration agree-
ments which, through asymmetric discovery provisions, did not 
provide one party78 sufficient opportunity for discovery as uncon-
scionable and thus unenforceable. However, post- Concepcion, 
courts have begun favoring enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments notwithstanding discovery concerns.  A recent judgment of 
the District Court for the Northern District of California, Lucas v. 
Hertz Corp., noted: 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Concepcion, nu-
merous courts, at both the state and federal level, found 
arbitration agreements substantively unconscionable 
where the rules of the arbitral forum allowed for only 
minimal discovery or where the affect of the discovery 
rules operated solely to one side’s benefit. 
. . . 
Concepcion, however, suggests that limitations on arbi-
tral discovery no longer support a finding of substantive 
unconscionability. 
. . . 
Although there is a difference between a failure to pro-
vide for ‘‘judicially monitored discovery’’ and a failure 
to affirmatively allow for any discovery devices to be 
used, the court believes the above reasoning applies 
with equal force here. And although they do not cite 
Concepcion, many post-Concepcion federal district 
court decisions taking up this issue suggest the same.79 
The justification for limiting discovery is to cap the costs 
of arbitration. Every requirement imposed upon a party to obtain 
                                                          
 76  See supra note 63 and text accompanying. 
 77  Hooters v. Phillips is another well-known matter. See, e.g., Hooters of 
America Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614, 618 (D. S.C. 1998); Hooters of 
America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F. 3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) (for the one-sided 
nature of discovery and disclosure of witnesses which the employer attempted 
to impose in that case). 
 78   Who is almost inevitably the consumer or the employee. 
 79  Lucas v. Hertz Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1007–08 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(citations omitted). 
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and provide information during arbitration increases the party’s 
costs. While limiting discovery is a frequent and uncontroversial 
practice in larger commercial arbitrations,80 its primary uses in 
that context are to expedite the dispute resolution process and en-
sure a greater protection of confidentiality than would be found 
in the litigation process, while simultaneously potentially reduc-
ing the processes’ costs. This latter point is magnified under a 
US-style costs regime in which legal fees and related expenses are 
non-recoverable irrespective of the outcome of the litigation. 
However, in these larger, non-consumer arbitrations, the 
asymmetries of information or resources found in consumer arbi-
trations are unlikely to be present. In these sorts of disputes both 
parties are likely to have sufficient awareness of the commercial 
context of the contract, copies of records relating to the transac-
tion in question, and sufficient resources to make any other sorts 
of investigations which may be necessary. This symmetry rarely 
exists in simple consumer arbitration. This difference in resources 
and information possessed by the parties in these two sorts of 
matters illustrates the difficulty with restrictions on discovery. 
The problem is to strike the appropriate balance between a re-
striction of discovery to enhance economies of time and costs, and 
a restriction of discovery which has the effect of eliminating one 
party from effectively vindicating their rights.  While the econo-
mies in theory81 will be passed on to consumers, restrictions on 
the use of discovery to deny access to needed information frus-
trates the dispute resolution process to the detriment of the con-
                                                          
 80  See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, International Dispute Reso-
lution Procedures, Art. 19; International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Ar-
bitration, Art. 20; LCIA, Arbitration Rules, Art. 20, 22; UNCITRAL, Arbitra-
tion Rules, Art. 24. For a discussion of discovery in international commercial 
arbitration, see BORN, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 11, at 778–791 (and 
the cases cited therein); BORN, LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 182–193; 
Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Understanding Discovery in International Commer-
cial Arbitration Through Behavioral Law and Economics: A Journey Inside 
the Minds of Parties and Arbitrators, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 165 (2011). 
 81  Writing pre-Concepcion, Ware, supra note 58, at 97, remarked: 
It is not clear whether these precedents will be extended to consumer arbitra-
tion or whether they require as much discovery as litigation has. If they require 
litigation-like discovery, they would raise the cost of arbitration to businesses 
and therefore raise prices to consumers.  Litigation-like discovery would both 
increase the amount of time and money the business must spend on the discov-
ery process and make it easier for consumers to prove their claims.” (Ware’s 
footnotes omitted).  The assumptions on which this position is based will be 
explored below. 
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sumer. 
C. The Use of “Carve-outs” 
“Carve-outs” are situations where one party (inevitably the 
company) reserves the right to litigate some disputes, but the oth-
er party (typically, the consumer) is required to arbitrate all mat-
ters.82 Such asymmetric contractual allocations of remedies are al-
leged to be unfair (hence unconscionable) precisely in virtue of 
this asymmetry. However, the asymmetry itself ought not to be 
viewed as the problem. Rather the source of the problem rests in 
the reasons why certain types of disputes have been carved out 
from the arbitration agreement. 
Typically such “carve-outs” reserve the right for the com-
pany to litigate in order to realize upon a security or claim a debt. 
As recent American experience with “robo-signing” in mortgage 
foreclosures attests, debt collection is a highly automated process. 
Most collections actions are undefended, proceeding as default 
judgments. The same would likely happen if the collection pro-
cess were to proceed through arbitration. The difficulty therefore 
is not with obtaining a judgment, but collecting it from a judg-
ment proof defendant.83 Obtaining an award—whether at arbi-
tration or as a result of litigation—is the easy part: the difficulty is 
enforcing the award through a garnishment of a bank account or 
wages, or through foreclosure or seizure and sale. 
Accordingly, the collections process requires a judgment, 
the additional step of obtaining some kind of garnisheeing order, 
and enforcement of the latter order. If this process were pursued 
through arbitration, an additional legal step is required.  This is 
usually of the form of an application (to a court) to convert the 
arbitrator’s award to a court order. 
Were “carve-outs” for collections processes eliminated, 
companies would be required to incur the expense of this addi-
tional legal step. Additionally, the costs of this step may serve as 
an impediment to collecting smaller debts owed to the company, 
the losses from which would be passed on to consumers in the 
form of higher prices and interest rates in financing agreements. 
                                                          
 82  Lackey v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 498 S.E.2d 898 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1998) is commonly taken as a classic example of such a use of carve-outs. 
 83  Ware, supra note 58, at 98. 
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D. Elimination of “Subsidized” Arbitration 
There is an argument that consumer arbitration, where 
the consumer pays less than half of the costs of the arbitration, is 
subsidized.  The argument continues that this in turn elevates the 
price of the goods or services purchased by  consumers. This ar-
gument is ultimately premised upon the principles that to the ex-
tent that a purchaser of a good or service does not pay the full 
price for any good or service, that purchaser is subsidized; and 
the principle that the subsidy will necessarily be recouped by the 
seller in the form of higher prices.84 However, Pre-Concepcion 
and Italian Colors employment85 and consumer contracts86 cases 
point to the proposition that significant dispute resolution costs 
act as a disincentive and sometimes barrier to the consum-
er/employee from availing herself of the arbitration procedure.  
These costs can arise where the consumer or employee is required 
to pay a non-trivial amount to engage in the arbitration process. 
In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, the Supreme 
Court appeared sympathetic to the argument that large arbitra-
tion costs impose barriers to the vindication of rights through that 
process. The court noted, “It may well be that the existence of 
large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph 
from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the ar-
bitral forum.”87 In Green Tree, however, the concern was that the 
arbitration record was silent on the matter of cost barriers.88 
                                                          
 84  See, e.g., id. at 95: 
It has long been customary in arbitration for the claimant to pay the filing fee 
charged by the arbitration organization and for the parties to pay equal shares 
of the arbitrator’s fee. Recent employment arbitration cases, however, have 
refused to enforce agreements requiring the employee-claimant to pay fees ac-
cording to this custom.  These cases effectively require the business to subsi-
dize the arbitration claim against it.  (footnotes omitted) 
 85  Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 
(10th Cir. 1999); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 
1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998); and Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare 
Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. 2000) are cited by Ware, supra note 58, 
at 95 n.38 as illustrative cases of this proposition. 
 86  A classic case is Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 
(2000). See also Lackey v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 498 S.E.2d 898 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1998). 
 87  Green Tree Financial Corp., 531 U.S. at 90. 
 88  Id. at 90–91: 
But the record does not show that Randolph will bear such costs if she goes to 
arbitration. Indeed, it contains hardly any information on the matter. . . . The 
record reveals only the arbitration agreement’s silence on the subject, and that 
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However, the post-Italian Colors landscape is somewhat differ-
ent. 
This concern was expressed in the aftermath of Italian 
Colors.89 In Italian Colors the claim could only be economically 
pursued as a class action or through the common action of pro-
spective claimants in the production of and payment for a market 
study. The arbitration agreement’s waiver of class action and re-
quirement of confidentiality precluded either course of action. 
Nevertheless, the Court held that this was consistent with federal 
policy under the FAA, as the agreement did not eliminate the 
right to pursue a remedy90 such a waiver merely made it more dif-
ficult for a prospective claimant to prove the claim.91 While the 
Court appeared careful not to explicitly overturn its decision in 
Green Tree, the Italian Colors decision raises doubt as to how 
long Green Tree will in fact survive.92 
IV.  THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS 
Restrictions in arbitration agreements are supported by 
economic arguments based on the assumptions that (1) entry and 
exit to markets are based on a rate of return equalization princi-
ple and (2) that in a competitive market savings will be passed on 
to consumers.93 The return equalization principle holds that in-
vestment will flow to markets in such a way as to equalize the re-
turn on investment (relative to risk). Hence if there were a pro-
spect of a super-normal return in a given sector, that prospect 
would attract further entry to the sector. This entry and the fur-
ther competition entailed by such entry, would result in prices, 
and thus returns, in that sector of the market dropping to normal. 
Over time, the return on investment would no longer be super-
                                                          
fact alone is plainly insufficient to render it unenforceable. The ‘‘risk’’ that 
Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the 
invalidation of an arbitration agreement. 
 89  See Franken, supra note 5, and text accompanying notes 47–48. 
 90  American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 
2310 (2013). 
 91  Id. at 2311. 
 92  Id. at 2310–11: 
That would certainly cover a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding 
the assertion of certain statutory rights. And it would perhaps cover filing and 
administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to 
the forum impracticable. 
(emphasis in original). 
 93  See Ware, supra note 58, at 91–92. 
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normal. 
The assumption that in a competitive market cost savings 
will be passed on to consumers, is a corollary of the first assump-
tion. It holds that in the event these savings are not passed on to 
the consumer, they represent a super-competitive return. This su-
per-competitive return will ultimately, and depending on the 
speed of market entry, may rapidly be eliminated by the entry of 
others into the sector. Such entry—or even its threat—will be suf-
ficient to drive down prices, thereby passing savings on to the 
consumer. 
While these economic arguments provide a priori grounds 
for the belief that exclusion of such remedies via arbitration can 
lower the prices consumers pay, two significant normative and 
economic objections can be raised. The former objection ques-
tions the realism of the economic assumptions underlying the ar-
gument, particularly in light of the characteristics of the indus-
tries which have adopted such exclusions.  
This objection has two prongs: the first prong is related to 
the structure of the market in which these waivers are found, to 
explore whether or not market entry and exit is as easy as as-
sumed (and thus the extent to which the return equalization prin-
ciple is applicable).  The second prong is related to the commer-
cial context in which those contracts containing the exclusions in 
question are found. The context in which these contractual waiv-
ers are found is in a market dominated by contracts of adhesion. 
The party in the weaker economic position simply cannot bargain 
its way into a less disadvantageous contractual position. In effect 
since there is no means of that party “paying more” to have the 
exclusion removed from the contract, the weaker party has no al-
ternative but to accept the contract as proffered. This has signifi-
cance not just for the economic assumptions on which the argu-
ment is premised, but also for our normative concern. In the 
remainder of this Part, we address these two points. 
The normative objection can be succinctly expressed as a 
concern: is the value of low prices at the exclusion of almost all 
else (and particular, the exclusion of those remedies which con-
cern us) to be taken as the sole goal which is to be pursued by 
these strategies? The evaluation of this concern raises normative 
questions of “justice” and “fairness,” which our analysis, based 
upon Rawls’ insights, will attempt to address. This is the focus of 
Part V. 
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A. Economic Assumptions: Are they Accurate? 
An examination of the assumptions used in the arguments 
that such exclusions reduce prices for consumers exacerbate our 
grounds for concern. The assumptions rest upon the premise that 
if these exclusions lead to supernormal return, other firms will en-
ter the market, increasing the supply of the goods or services, 
thereby causing a drop in prices. Even the threat of entry is suffi-
cient to temper attempts at obtaining super-competitive returns. 
The locus classicus of such thinking can be found in the works of 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig.94 Their view of a “contestable mar-
ket” suggests that in markets with free entry and exit there will be 
a competitive constraint, in that this threat of entry tempers loss 
of consumer welfare, even in the case where the incumbent is a 
monopoly or an oligopolistic concentration.95 Baumerol et al.’s 
writings on contestable markets have had a non-trivial effect on 
the development of antitrust policy in the US96 and EU97 since the 
mid-1980s. 
Yet, the conditions required for a contestable market are 
quite strong. As one reviewer notes, a contestable market exhibits 
the following: 
. . . under certain structural conditions on technology 
and certain technical requirements on demands, fric-
tionless entry and exit together with equal access to 
technology lead to a type of competitive equilibrium 
with desirable welfare consequences, even though there 
may be only one active firm in equilibrium. A market 
with the foregoing characteristics of frictionless reversi-
ble entry and equal access to technology is called a “per-
fectly contestable market” . . . . The market for air travel 
                                                          
 94  WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR & ROBERT D. WILLIG,, 
CONTESTABLE MARKETS: THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); 
however, some chapters of this work appeared earlier in article form. 
 95  Id. at 5–7. 
 96  See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE 
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 33-36(4th ed. 2011). 
 97  See, e.g., Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 & T-388/94, Eur. Night 
Services Ltd. (ENS) et al. v. Comm’n, 1998 E.C.R. II-3141, ¶ 137  (stressing 
that the examination of conditions of competition is based on already present 
existing competition between undertakings and on potential competition); Cf., 
Commission Notice, 1997 O.J. C 372/033 ¶ 24 (noting the third source of com-
petitive restraint, potential competition is not considered when defining mar-
kets). 
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between two cities serves as a canonical example.98 
The conditions for such a market are: (1) easy (i.e., low/no 
cost) entry to the market, in particular, “The entrant can immedi-
ately duplicate and entirely replace any existing firm, even a 
complete monopolist.”99 Ease of entry into a market requires not 
just the capital to enter into the market, but also the ability to 
overcome any regulatory barriers which impede entry. Condition 
(2) holds that exit from the market must also be easy (i.e., cost-
less).100 While sale or leasing of assets can reduce the friction of 
exit, sunk costs involved with intangibles (goodwill, advertising, 
non-transferable licenses, etc.) move the actual market further 
away from the paradigm of the contestable market. Hence the 
market is characterized by “costlessly reversible entry.”101 A corol-
lary of the former two points is condition (3) that there is equal 
access to the technology and infrastructure required by the mar-
ket to produce and/or deliver the goods.102 And condition (4) holds 
that a new entrant can establish itself on the market instantane-
ously, “The entrant can establish itself before an existing firm 
makes any price response.”103 In effect, such a contestable market 
can be described as one where it is possible to “hit and run,” i.e., 
enter and leave the market rapidly and without expense. 
Baumol et al. use the example of air travel as an illustra-
tion: 
Consider two towns between which the demand for 
travel is only sufficient to support one flight a day. This 
is a natural monopoly market. And yet, because airline 
equipment (virtually “capital on wings”) is so freely mo-
bile, entry into the market can be fully reversible. In 
principle, faced with a profitable opportunity in such a 
market, an entrant need merely fly his airplane into the 
airport, undercut the incumbent’s price, and fly the 
route profitably. Then should the incumbent respond 
                                                          
 98  William A. Brock, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry 
Structure: A Review Article, 91 J. POL. ECON. 1055, 1055 (1983); See also 
BAUMOL, PANZAR & WILLIS, supra  note 94, at 5. 
 99  William G. Shepherd, “Contestability” vs. Competition, 74 AM. ECON. 
REV. 572, 573 (1984). 
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. at 576. 
 102  In the canonical example of air travel, this would include equality of 
access to slot pairs. 
 103  Sheppard, supra note 99, at 573. 
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with a sufficient price reduction, the entrepreneur need 
only fly his airplane away to take advantage of some 
other lucrative option—even if he only returns his rent-
ed aircraft or resells it in the well-functioning secondary 
aircraft market. Thus it is highly plausible that air trav-
el provides real examples of contestable markets.104 
This may overstate their case.105  As Sheppard notes, the 
assumptions on which Baumol et al. build their case are very de-
manding.106  Further, even in the example of air travel, one won-
ders how fast a potential entrant can establish itself in a new 
market, whether this speed exceeds the incumbent’s ability to 
drop prices, how low the sunk costs in establishing a new route 
are, and whether the secondary aircraft market is sufficiently effi-
cient to allow costless exit from aircraft ownership or lease.107 
The commercial parties in Concepcion, Brown, and Ital-
ian Colors operate in markets which are structurally different 
from contestable markets, as we show below. I further note that 
the further from the structure of a contestable market a particular 
market is, the more susceptible that particular market is to collu-
sion (cartelization). 
Developing on the work of Steigler,108 industrial organiza-
tion economists109 have identified numerous features in a mar-
ket’s structure which are conducive to collusive conduct by play-
                                                          
 104  BAUMOL, PANZAR & WILLIS, supra note 94, at 7. 
 105  See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 99, at 581 (noting that airlines and long 
distance telephone services do not reflect ultra-free entry; rather, airline shifts 
have been far from instantaneous, and entrants into long-distance telephone 
service gained a mere five percent of the market in the course of four years); 
See, e.g., Id. at 575 (noting that “. . . Baumol et al.’s optimism about efficiency 
appears to exceed even Chicago school levels”). 
 106  Id. at 573: “These conditions are pure, and the deductive results hold 
only when they hold. Under any departures from the pure conditions, Baumol 
et al.’s deductive analysis becomes speculative. One can revert then to the ex-
tensive literature on entry barriers for guidance in estimating the outcomes.” 
 107  See also MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 73-75 (1st ed. 2004) (describing problems with the Baumol, Panzar 
and Willig’s assumptions). 
 108  George J. Steigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964). 
 109  See, e.g., ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS 
OF COLLUSION: CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS 211–37 (2012); See William E. 
Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus Fac-
tors and Agreement in Antitrust, 110 MICH L. REV. 393 (2011); See Margaret 
C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. 
ECON. LIT. 43 (2006). 
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ers in the market. Prominent among these features which allow 
for ease in collusion are: 
x Inelastic demand of the product; 
x A concentrated sellers’ market; 
x Barriers to entry; 
x Lack of concentration in the buyers’ market; 
and, 
x Homogeneous goods.110 
This is not an exhaustive list.111 It, however, does show 
that the industries in which these recent US cases originated are 
not only different from paradigmatic contestable markets, but are 
markets which are more susceptible to collusion.112 In Concepcion 
the market related to cellular telephones and services (a homoge-
nous commodity), in Brown it was care home services, and in 
Italian Colors the market involved charge cards. There are signif-
icant entry barriers to the cellular phone market: these include 
regulatory approval and infrastructure access (the ability to use 
transmission towers and have access to other networks for call-
termination). The advertising expenditure required to promote a 
viable alternative network is a significant sunk cost, and thus 
represents a formidable exit barrier. 
Care homes require some regulatory approval, sunk costs 
in the development of specialized facilities, and the existence of 
long-term care contracts provides a formidable exit barrier. The 
geographic markets tend to be concentrated. Credit and charge 
card markets are two-sided platforms which require significant 
cost (and a non-trivial amount of time) to develop. The greater 
the developmental cost necessary to enter (and compete on) the 
market, the further away that market is from a contestable mar-
ket (due to the exit friction of sunk costs).  Likewise, the greater 
                                                          
 110  See Cento Veljanovski, The Economics of Cartels, FINNISH 
COMPETITION LAW YEAR BOOK 4-6 (2006) (Veljanovski does not add homo-
geneity of product as a characteristic; however, a significant number of major 
domestic and international cartels involve homogenous goods). 
 111  See id. (noting that absence of non-price competition, high risk of 
bankruptcy, static or declining demand, multi-market contacts, a market in 
intermediate products and a history of collusion are others); See sources cited 
supra note 109. 
 112  See supra note 109. 
35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 62 Side B      06/02/2014   15:10:17
35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 62 Side B      06/02/2014   15:10:17
C M
Y K
Wardhaugh Article1.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2014  2:33 PM 
458 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 26:3 
the time it takes for a product (such as a charge card) to be ac-
cepted in the market, the less instantaneous the challenger’s entry 
can be, thus permitting the incumbent a greater opportunity to 
respond. This market structure can thus lead to collusive behav-
ior in the market. 113 Such collusion will often take the form of 
standardization in terms of service. 
B. The Commercial Context and Contracts of Adhesion 
The consumer contracts that are the source of the present 
discussion are in effect contracts of adhesion, with no room for 
the consumer to bargain and pay for additional remedies. In the 
Concepcions’ case there would have been no opportunity for 
them to offer or be presented a second contract which permitted 
class action suits in exchange for a premium on their monthly cel-
lular phone charge, nor was the Brown family able to pay a sup-
plement to the care fees to ensure that jury awards would be 
available were Clarence Brown mistreated. The “negotiating pro-
cess” (if one could call it that) which went into the formulation of 
these contracts was vastly different from a situation where there 
is some “give and take” in what one wants and is willing to pay. 
Indeed, the process of buying, say, a computer has greater scope 
for the “purchase” of additional remedies: one is almost always 
presented with the option of buying an extended warranty. Hence 
in cases such as this, some additional protection or remedies are 
available, albeit for a price. 
Theories suggesting the equalization of a rate of return or 
contestability of the particular market might imply the entry of a 
maverick into the market to provide the product but without the 
exclusions normally demanded by the incumbents. Yet, high en-
try and exit barriers prevent the emergence of such contenders. 
Indeed, the absence of alternatives to the contracts proffered to 
the consumers in each of these cases is significant. The unavaila-
bility of alternatives casts doubt on the contestable nature of the 
markets and the applicability of the equalization of return princi-
ple within those particular markets. And the highly concentrated 
nature of the market may be suggestive of some sort of coordinat-
ed activity, if not outright collusion. 
The use of arbitration-facilitated exclusions in employ-
ment contracts adds an additional level of concern. These con-
                                                          
 113  See also, MOTTA, supra note 107, at 142–49 (discussing the market 
structure and product characteristics facilitating collusive behavior). 
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tracts are most certainly contracts of adhesion, presented to 
someone who is in weaker bargaining position than the entity 
which presents the contract. Outside of the occasional superstar, 
very few employees have sufficient bargaining power to have 
much influence on the terms and conditions of their employment. 
Even when such power exists, it is unlikely to extend to the 
means by which disputes are resolved, due to industry practice. 
Last year’s MVP, who is this year’s free agent, is unlikely to be 
able to bargain their way out of the league’s employment dispute 
resolution provision. In the context in which the contracts in 
question occurred, the employee was very much a replaceable, 
homogenous good for the employer. Had he or she balked at 
agreeing to the terms proffered, another employee would have 
been hired in their stead.114 And it would be somewhat disingen-
uous to suggest that another employer would have gladly come 
along and offered these employees contracts without the exclu-
sions for some consideration in the form of a slightly reduced 
wage. The commercial context in the cases of both consumer and 
employment contracts raises the normative challenges of “justice” 
and “fairness,” which we explore in the following section. 
V.  A RAWLSIAN DIGRESSION: ARE THESE EXCLUSIONS 
FAIR? 
Given that in the case of exclusions of remedies through 
the use of arbitration agreements no supplementary remedies are 
available (even at a price) it is worth inquiring whether this situa-
tion could be regarded as just or fair. This is particularly so given 
the push within Congress for reforms to the Federal Arbitration 
Act on fairness grounds. While discussions of justice have been 
an ongoing theme in the western intellectual tradition since at 
least the time of Plato, Rawls’ late twentieth century analysis of 
the idea of justice115 within a liberal society, and its explicit link 
to a sophisticated analysis of fairness is an appropriate point from 
                                                          
 114  See also Cole v. Burns Security Services, 105 F. 3d 1465, 1469 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (noting that the contract of employment included the following term: 
“YOU MAY WISH TO CONSULT AN ATTORNEY PRIOR TO SIGNING 
THIS AGREEMENT. IF SO, TAKE A COPY OF THIS FORM WITH 
YOU. HOWEVER, YOU WILL NOT BE OFFERED EMPLOYMENT 
UNTIL THIS FORM IS SIGNED AND RETURNED BY YOU.”) Cole was 
required to agree to the contract after his original employer was taken over by 
Burns. Id. 
 115  RAWLS, supra note 10. 
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which to begin our analysis. 
The central conception which motivates Rawls’ theory is 
an understanding of the need to develop a procedure or condi-
tions by which parties can come to a hypothetical agreement on 
developing what would be viewed by those parties as fair or just 
institutions. Those coming to such an agreement, Rawls suggests, 
would be highly risk averse116 and this risk aversion would shape 
their attitudes to their choice of institutions. Key to Rawls’ analy-
sis of fairness and the shaping of fair institutions is the insight 
that such institutions be designed by those who are unable to take 
advantage of any morally irrelevant characteristics which they 
could use for their advantage in the design of such institutions.117 
Rawls’ insight is to place the bargaining parties into a situation 
where no irrelevant information can have an influence on what 
option a party would choose, hence that party could not bargain 
from a position of self-interest. This is the meaning behind the 
maxim “justice as fairness,” which drives the bulk of Rawls’ ar-
gument. 
Institutional choice would be made behind a hypothetical 
“veil of ignorance.”118 This veil of ignorance is a thought experi-
ment developed by Rawls119 to allow one to determine what 
choices would be made by people who were unable to bargain 
from a position of self-interest using morally irrelevant infor-
mation. Rawls describes the concept thus: 
It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation char-
acterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice. 
Among the essential features of this situation is that no 
one knows his place in society, his class position or so-
cial status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the dis-
tribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, 
strength and the like. I shall even assume that the par-
ties do not know their conceptions of the good or their 
special psychological propensities. The principles of jus-
                                                          
 116  Id. at 132–53. 
 117  Id. at 11, 118–23. 
 118  This approach has been suggested by Sternlight and Jensen. See Stern-
light & Jensen, supra note 46, at 96, n.128; see also Bruce Wardhaugh, A Nor-
mative Approach to the Criminalization of Cartel Activity, 32 LEGAL STUD. 
369 (2012) (discussing Rawls’ use of this thought experiment to argue that the 
market would be the means of distributive justice chosen in a just society and 
the sort of conduct one would expect in such a market). 
 119  RAWLS, supra note 10. 
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tice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures 
that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the 
choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or 
the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are 
similarly situated and no one is able to design principles 
to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice 
are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. . . . The 
original position is, one might say, the appropriate ini-
tial status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements 
reached in it are fair. This explains the propriety of the 
name “justice as fairness:” it conveys the idea that the 
principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation 
that is fair.120 
The hypothetical choices made in this thought experiment 
will be shaped by the information that can be provided to the 
participants. Initially, little information is provided, and the par-
ticipants will formulate the most basic social and legal principles. 
Institutional design will come later, as the veil is metaphorically 
“lifted” and the participants gain more general knowledge about 
the society for which the institutions are developed.  However, 
this knowledge is still sufficiently non-specific so that it cannot be 
used for self-interested purposes. 
Those selecting under the veil of ignorance are also de-
prived of any knowledge of probabilities of possible outcomes. 
This ensures that any principles chosen or social institutions de-
signed by them are done in ignorance of any morally irrelevant 
factors which can be used for the advantage of those so selecting 
or designing. Additionally, those under the veil are risk adverse, 
and unwilling to gamble. Hence choices will be made under a 
maximin principle of choice under uncertainty which suggests a 
ranking of possible outcomes and a choice of the least bad out-
come (i.e., maximize the minimum).121 
The participants would initially choose fundamental prin-
ciples, and then as the veil was lifted, design social institutions. 
The choice of fundamental principles and design of institutions is 
guided by this risk aversion. Rawls notes: 
                                                          
 120  Id. at 11; See also id. at 118–23 (elaborating and justifying restrictions 
found “under the veil of ignorance”). 
 121  See also MELVIN DRESHER, GAMES OF STRATEGY: THEORY AND 
APPLICATIONS 21-35 (1961) (presenting a classic, albeit formal, discussion of 
this rule). 
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[In the original position] the person choosing has a con-
ception of the good such that he cares very little, if any-
thing, for what he might gain above the minimum sti-
pend that he can, in fact, be sure of by following the 
maximin rule. It is not worthwhile for him to take a 
chance for the sake of a further advantage, especially 
when it may turn out that he loses much that is im-
portant to him.122 
From this position, Rawls argues that those under the veil 
agree upon two principles of justice. To avoid conflicts between 
competing applications of the principles they would be ranked in 
lexical order with priority given to the first principle. 
These principles of justice, in their final version,123 are: 
First Principle 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most exten-
sive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with 
a similar system of liberties for all. 
Second Principle 
Social and economic liberties are to be arranged so that 
they are both: 
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, con-
sistent with the just savings principle, and 
attached to offices and positions open to all under condi-
tions of fair equality of opportunity.124 
Given their foundational nature, these principles of justice 
will shape the participants’ formulation of all other social institu-
tions. Hence the promotion of liberty, when consistent with equal 
liberties for others, will be a fundamental precept by which legal 
and social institutions are designed. Likewise, the underlying 
maximin rule which prompted the choice of the two principles of 
justice will also prompt similar risk aversion—and hence consid-
erations of fairness—when more specific social and legal institu-
                                                          
 122   RAWLS, supra note 10, at 134. 
 123  Id. at 53 (initially presenting a preliminary version, which contains 
some ambiguities resolved in subsequent discussion). 
 124  Id. at 266. 
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tions (such as legal codes and dispute resolution means) are de-
signed. 
In designing such institutions, this metaphorical “veil of 
ignorance” precludes a participant in the bargaining (i.e., design) 
process from knowing their role in the application of the institu-
tion, the likelihood that particular events would occur, and the 
costs of these events. Further, the application of the “veil of igno-
rance” excludes knowledge of probabilities and amounts from the 
bargaining parties’ knowledge,125 thereby precluding parties de-
signing social institutions from using expected value calculation 
in their design. 
Those designing a legal system under a “veil of ignorance” 
would initially arrive at the two principles of justice identified 
above.126 The principles serve to establish the foundation of any 
liberal society, upon which the most general economic and legal 
institutions would be established. The principle of liberty would 
point towards both a market-based means of distributive jus-
tice,127 and a democratic constitution.128 Once these fundamental 
legal and economic principles are established, or agreed upon, 
those under the veil would be provided with more information 
which they would be able to use in developing more specific legal 
fields designed to respond to the more particular social circum-
stances facing those under the veil. 
It would be at this point where our hypothetical social ar-
chitects would design the legal regimes regulating our interaction. 
These would include contract regimes to govern our voluntary 
exchanges and tort and criminal regimes to govern involuntary 
interactions. In addition to these substantive principles, those un-
der the veil would also design the procedural systems which 
would be used to give effect to the substantive regimes. While the 
information made available to those hypothetically designing 
such a system would be more complete during the process of de-
sign, the designers would never be provided with information 
that they could use to their own advantage. This would ensure 
that the substantive regimes and procedural rules are not in any 
way biased. For instance, since those designing the legal rules 
surrounding accident compensation would not know if they 
would be tortfeasors or victims, there would be every incentive 
                                                          
 125  Id. at 148–53, 160. 
 126  See supra text accompanying notes 122–123. 
 127  RAWLS, supra note 10, at 239–43. 
 128  Id. at 173–75, 195–200. 
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not to design the tort system (and the procedural means by which 
it is enforced) to favor either victims or tortfeasors. 
Once these legal regimes of general application are devel-
oped and as the legal architects obtain further information about 
the society whose legal system they are developing, the architects 
will be in a position to enlarge the regime by adding legal rules 
and systems to complement those developed earlier. For instance, 
a “basic” intellectual property regime which provides copyright 
protection for printed media can be supplemented by providing 
protection for digital media, once the architects recognize that the 
society for which they are designing a legal system is sufficiently 
technologically advanced to require such security. 
Likewise, supplementary provisions can also be added to 
procedural regimes via a developed and recognized alternative 
dispute resolution (“ADR”) system outside of, but complementary 
to, the courts. In family matters, for example, systems of pre-trial 
mediation may be added to take the “edge” off an adversarial sys-
tem (if the architects indeed opted for an adversarial system). 
Similarly, arbitration panels could be established to facilitate dis-
pute resolution, by offering arbitrators whose expertise reduces 
the chance of decision error which may result from a non-
specialist judge deciding the matter; or by offering speedier reso-
lution to a matter than would be perhaps obtained by waiting 
one’s turn in an overcrowded docket.129 
What is fundamental about these supplementary provi-
sions—whether substantive or procedural—is that they build on 
and are additions to the preexisting legal regimes that they en-
hance. As such, the regime on which the supplement rests serves 
as the baseline for the “fairness” or justice of the supplementary 
provisions which augment it. As an example, as the principles of 
justice serve as a baseline for the moral legitimacy of the constitu-
tion which underpins the legal system, it would be improbable 
that Rawlsian social architects would design a society’s constitu-
tion the provisions of which would fall below the standards of the 
two principles of justice. It is submitted that the Rawlsian legal 
architects designing ADR provisions to supplement existing pro-
cedural institutions (and their rules) would use what exists as a 
baseline for the fairness. This baseline serves as a yardstick to 
measure the fairness of what is developed as a supplement. Ac-
                                                          
 129  See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Is Adjudication a Public Good?  “Over-
crowded Courts” and the Private Sector Alternative of Arbitration, 14 
CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 899 (2013). 
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cordingly, as a baseline, these legal standards should serve as a 
minimum by which any supplementary institutions constructed 
“on to of them,” are to be evaluated. 
This Rawlsian lens can permit us to focus our analysis of 
the fairness or justice of arbitration systems and exceptions. 
There are two focal points to the discussion. The first is in re-
gards to the fairness of arbitration procedures. The second focus 
concerns the exceptions imposed by these arbitration agreements, 
to determine the extent that such exceptions may be viewed as 
unjust or unfair, in the sophisticated sense shown by this analysis, 
and not in the intuitive, instinctive sense which informs much of 
the rhetoric surrounding the controversy. In effect, the Rawlsian 
lens asks us to examine these points from the perspective of a dis-
interested party. As noted above, this disinterest takes the form of 
ignorance, in the literal sense, i.e., a lack of knowledge of that 
party’s present or future position, to ensure that party’s inability 
to use such information to its advantage in subsequent design of 
any social or legal institution. 
By applying this lens to arbitration generally, as an ad-
junct to the public system and as long as the arbitration regime 
was freely chosen by all parties, a system of arbitration in skeletal 
form would appear to be unproblematic. Like the court system it 
supplements, a neutral party is charged with resolving the dis-
pute between parties. As a supplement to this system, it will not 
fall below the baseline of fairness of the court system. Further, 
the first principle of liberty,130 guaranteeing the greatest set of lib-
erties co-extensive with an equal set for others, compels granting 
individuals the opportunity to select such a system of dispute res-
olution. 
It is when the metaphorical skeleton of arbitration—
particularly in the consumer context—gets “fleshed out” that dif-
ficulties arise. If we apply this thought experiment to the four ex-
clusions at issue, I suggest our results would be mixed if not in-
conclusive. Limitations on discovery are a procedural matter. 
Looked at through the Rawlsian lens, there is no easy, a priori 
answer to the fairness issue. Although the arbitration system’s 
use of discovery analogous to the regime mandated by the more 
general litigation would ensure a baseline of fairness, truncated 
discovery can also be fair. Illustrative of this are the limitations to 
discovery imposed by the rules of the major international, com-
                                                          
 130  See RAWLS, supra note 10. 
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mercial arbitration institutions.131 The significance of the limits 
imposed in such arbitrations is that they are symmetric, imposing 
identical limitations on each side to the dispute. Under the uncer-
tainty imposed by the “veil of ignorance” of not knowing “which 
side” of a dispute a designer of the system will be on, it would be 
highly unlikely that—in the absence of countervailing considera-
tions—the Rawlsian legal architect would design a system of dis-
pute resolution which incorporates such asymmetries. Indeed, it 
is submitted that if the Rawlsian analysis of fairness advocated in 
this paper is accepted, then asymmetries in the arbitration regime 
should serve as a prima facie screen of unfairness. 
However, asymmetries are only prima facie screens. Coun-
tervailing considerations may well exist which could justify 
asymmetry.  “Carve-outs” for collections may be one such exam-
ple. If the parties—under a “veil of ignorance”—were aware that 
(1) the vast majority of majority of collections actions proceed in 
default132 and (2) commencing collections by arbitration required 
the addition of an extra legal step,133 which adds expense to the 
procedure, the parties may very well agree to this asymmetry. 
Given that consumers would benefit from not bearing the burden 
of costs arising from these redundant legal steps, the asymmetry 
of the “carve-outs” may well be regarded as failures, when exam-
ined under this lens. 
The exclusion of certain categories of damages (e.g., puni-
tive damages) and class remedies is problematic. Where such 
remedies are unavailable in the underlying legal system, there is 
no concern that their exclusion by way of arbitration reduces the 
level of justice offered by that supplementary ADR regime. It is 
significant to note that in Europe, punitive damages are extreme-
ly limited134 and class actions are ill-developed.135 To facilitate re-
dress of consumer and competition claims, the European Com-
mission and Parliament have, over the past few years, been 
drafting proposals to expand and harmonize collective redress re-
                                                          
 131  See sources cited supra note 80 
 132  See supra text accompanying notes 80–81. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Indeed, in the Franch legal regime, the maxim “tout le dommage, mais 
rein que le dommage,” (“all the damage, but nothing more than the damage”) 
applies as the maxim to measure and limit compensation. 
 135  See, e.g., JURGEN G. BACKHAUS, ALBERTO CASSONE & GIOVANNI B. 
RAMELIO, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CLASS ACTIONS IN EUROPE: 
LESSONS FROM AMERICA (2012); see, e.g., Wardhaugh, Bogeymen, supra note 
67, at 16–22. 
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gimes within the differing European legal systems.136 The most 
recent (June 2013)137 proposal involves an opt-in (versus the US-
style opt-out) system, designed specifically to prevent the impor-
tation of perceived American-style abuses into Europe.138 As class 
claims and punitive damages are not well-developed features of 
the European legal landscape, fears of the use of arbitration in 
consumer matters to deprive consumers of this remedy would be 
misplaced.139 Indeed the European response to the use of arbitra-
tion in consumer matters shows little other than fears of asym-
metric bargaining strength in contracts of adhesion.140 However, 
in a jurisdiction (such as the US), in which such remedies and 
procedural devices are available, to require a party to forego 
them (via a contract of adhesion) appears to fall below the mini-
mum standard of justice which appears through the Rawlsian 
lens, unless other compensatory benefits are passed on in ex-
change. 
But while the elimination of such remedies and procedural 
devices will reduce the costs to consumers—assuming that the 
savings will be passed on to consumers—it is far from clear that 
savings from the excluded remedies would be welcomed by con-
sumers were they given a choice. Even if this assumption is cor-
rect, as consumers, we may wish to pay more (as a sort of insur-
                                                          
 136 See, e.g., id., at 13–18. 
 137  Commission Recommendation of XXX on Common Principles for In-
junctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member 
States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union Law, Strasbourg 
XXX, 2013 C 3539/3, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf; Commission Com-
munication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards a Europe-
an Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress” Brussels, XXX, 2013 COM 
401/2, available at  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/com_2013_401_en.pdf. 
 138  See also Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Recommends 
Member States to Have Collective Redress Mechanisms in Place to Ensure Ef-
fective Access to Justice (June 11, 2013), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-524_en.htm (quoting Vice-President 
Viviane Reding “Member States have very different legal traditions in collec-
tive redress and the Commission wants to respect these. Our initiative aims to 
bring more coherence when EU law is at stake. . .This Recommendation is a 
balanced approach to improve access to justice for citizens while avoiding a 
US-style system of class actions and the risk of frivolous claims and abusive 
litigation”). 
 139  It makes no sense to suggest that arbitration can be used to deny a 
remedy to which a party has no legal entitlement. 
 140  See supra text accompanying note 53. 
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ance policy) in order to have the benefits of collective remedies 
and recourse to classes of damages which might be otherwise ex-
cluded. However, if the assumption is false and the market struc-
ture of the industries in which these exclusions are found is in-
deed anti-competitive, a different result follows.  The so-called 
“savings” from the excluded remedies are thus retained by the 
firms as a form of appropriated consumer surplus.  If these exclu-
sions are used to facilitate such anti-competitive conduct, then it 
is further submitted, they would fail the test of fairness. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing Rawlsian analysis casts doubts on whether 
the practice of using arbitration agreements to exclude certain 
remedies and means of pursuing remedies is just. The underlying 
insight of the theory is to show, via a thorough experiment, that a 
fair or just institution would be the sort of institution that is de-
signed by those who have no knowledge of how that institution 
would affect them. The architects of the relevant social institution 
are placed under a metaphorical “veil of ignorance” which pre-
cludes them from being aware of any morally irrelevant infor-
mation which they could use to their own advantage in the insti-
tution’s design. Being risk adverse, particularly with their liberty 
interests, these hypothetical social and legal architects would de-
sign fair social and legal systems. 
Given that those designing the institution would be ren-
dered ignorant of how this institution could possibly affect them, 
this Rawlsian analysis suggested that the existence of symmetry 
of the rights and obligations of parties within an institutional 
framework was indicative of such fairness. Deprived of morally 
irrelevant knowledge, the Rawlsian who drafts a consumer arbi-
tration contract would be unaware (once the “veil of ignorance” is 
lifted) which side of the bargain they would be facing. According-
ly, the agreement would not be drafted to advance the interests of 
one side over the other. 
A “real world” example of such contracts might be found 
in those commodities contracts (and the arbitration institutions 
which resolve disputes arising from transactions governed by 
them) used by trading houses whose business is dealing in these 
goods.141 Given their near universal use in the trade, and that the 
parties using them use them as both buyers and sellers, these con-
                                                          
 141  See supra text accompanying notes 13–14. 
35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 68 Side A      06/02/2014   15:10:17
35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 68 Side A      06/02/2014   15:10:17
C M
Y K
Wardhaugh Article1.docx (Do Not Delete)  5/21/2014  2:33 PM 
2014 Unveiling Fairness for the Consumer 469 
tracts exhibit no asymmetries which advantage one side over the 
other. Indeed, as the parties to the contracts would be buyers 
about half the time, and sellers the other half, it would make no 
commercial sense for asymmetric contracts to be used. 
However, as I have argued, under this Rawlsian lens, 
asymmetry is only a prima facie indicium of unfairness. Asymme-
tries in contractual rights and obligations may give rise to a pre-
sumption of fairness, but this presumption is nevertheless rebut-
table. My discussion of asymmetrical collections “carve-outs” 
showed that they may in fact be fair. If such “carve-outs” promote 
cost savings which are then passed onto consumers, these savings 
may represent an appropriate quid pro quo for the lost opportuni-
ty to arbitrate collections matter. Indeed, given that such collec-
tions actions usually proceed in default, the cost of this lost op-
portunity is likely negligible. 
On the other hand, investigation of other asymmetries 
points in a different direction. As seen above, the elimination of 
class actions and punitive damages via arbitration agreements 
appear not just to be uncompensated for by other benefits flow-
ing from the agreement, but part of a general practice in indus-
tries whose structure is susceptible to collusion. If this is the case, 
such industrial structure casts into doubt the veracity of many of 
those assumptions underlying the arguments used to support the 
expansion of arbitration agreements to eliminate consumers’ ac-
cess to such remedies. But what is significant is that this paper 
shows that not all exceptions can be treated as unequivocally un-
fair or unjust: some may be beneficial to consumers. Accordingly, 
efforts to condemn them generally—as done in Europe and has 
been proposed from time-to-time in the US—are likely over-
broad. “Putting on” and then “pulling aside” a Rawlsian “veil of 
ignorance” serves as an appropriate, albeit metaphorical, means 
of demonstrating these points. 
 
 
 
 
